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1.  INTRODUCTION
The construction of efficient transport infrastructure networks is essential for
economic growth, in order to facilitate trade. For several decades,
industrialized nations have been investing considerable sums in such projects,
but increasing traffic and the desire to ensure balanced regional development
mean this effort must be continued (Barrett, 1999). However, the changing
economic climate forces national, local and regional governments to stabilize
or drastically cut public infrastructure investment budgets. Furthermore, the
existing networks are ageing, which raises the question of maintaining these
infrastructure assets. Too frequently, in order to cope with these budgetary
restrictions, the easy solution of delaying preventive maintenance has been
applied and many countries now need to devote a considerable percentage of
their budget to costly renovation works, or even reconstruction, to the
detriment of new construction (Spackman, 2002). In addition, economic logic
has meant that the most profitable infrastructures, i.e. those with the highest
traffic levels and time savings, were constructed first, and current projects
often have a lower economic rate of return and are financially unprofitable.
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) (Section 2), are therefore becoming more
common, in particular as a result of budgetary restrictions, but these may
require large public investment grants. Shadow tolls (Section 3) were first
introduced as a means of guaranteeing the necessary revenue in the light of
the considerable risks as regards traffic levels for tolled infrastructures, or as a
means of financing the maintenance of existing untolled infrastructure. We
have developed (Section 4) a theoretical financing model in order to
investigate the conditions under which shadow tolls can provide an alternative
to investment grants. Using a few key financial structure variables, we have
then conducted a number of simulations (Section 5) to investigate the
conditions under which a system of this type could be of interest to public
authorities. The conclusion (Section 6) discusses some ideas for improving
the model with a view to increasing the use of shadow tolls to finance
infrastructure.
2.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PPP IN ORDER TO COPE WITH THE
SHORTAGE OF PUBLIC FUNDS
In response to the shortage of available public funds, to mobilize private
capital and to share the risks that are inherent to infrastructure projects the
public authorities in an increasing number of countries have decided to make2/17
use of Public-Private Partnerships. The shift from traditional arrangements
such as BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) to more complex ones such as DBFO
(Design-Build-Finance-Operate), aims to involve a private consortium in all or
part of the process of constructing and funding, rehabilitating and increasing
the capacity of a piece of infrastructure. In the case of tolled infrastructure the
benefit of this system is that it brings in private capital, the return on which is
provided by commercial revenue in the framework of a long-term concession
contract. The use of such partnerships is often justified not only on the
grounds of budgetary constraints but also because of their high efficiency, in
particular with regard to the management of invested capital (Spackman,
2002).
In France, use of Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) were essentially
developed with the creation of the interurban motorway network and took a
specific form. Companies with either public or private capital were assigned
the task of constructing motorway sections as part of a specific type of
linkage; the financing of new sections was facilitated by the possibility of using
the toll revenue from existing sections. Future motorways were thus to a
considerable extent funded by the users of the existing ones. This system has
now become problematic as the European Commission has decided that it
infringed the principal of free competition as it does not permit a new player to
enter the market for motorway concessions on a level footing with existing
companies. It would therefore appear that for new motorways a financial set-
up is required which provides profitability when only a single section is
constructed. However, as has been mentioned already, the forecast traffic on
these new sections is not sufficient for them to be profitable. A contribution
from public funds is therefore required to ensure adequate profitability for the
operating company (Bonnafous, 2002).
Usually, a contribution of this type takes the form of grant that reduces the
capital costs that must be met by the concessionary. A number of simulations
performed with current projects show that at the present time the level of
subsidies can amount to between 50% and 90% of the total capital cost,
which in some cases casts doubt on the benefits of entrusting these projects
to the private sector. On the other hand, national government is unable to
release investment funding on this scale, which means that the project could
be postponed indefinitely. In order to mobilize the necessary funding, the
national government usually attempts to involve the regional and local
government which will benefit from the projects in question (Départements,
Cities and Regions). While this solution has the advantage that it requires less
central government funding and therefore lowers the public debt, all it does is
to transfer the problem to a lower level. This has the advantage that it may
help to quell the zeal of elected representatives who are forced to face up to
their responsibilities, but local and regional governments are themselves in
financial difficulty and do not always have ready access to loans. Thus, they
too are looking for alternative modes of finance to ensure that the construction
of infrastructure which is necessary for their economic development is not
prevented. 3/17
While the shortage of public funds encourages governments to turn towards
Public-Private Partnerships, they are nevertheless aware that the mobilization
of private funds imposes faster returns on investment and that the overall
result of this is to increase the total cost of their projects. On the basis of the
experience of neighbouring countries, they are now becoming interested in
funding by means of shadow tolls, a system which they consider will enable
them to spread out the expenditure, even if it involves a wager on future
resources. This provides a potential means of avoiding the difficulty of raising
the loans that are necessary to provide investment grants.
3.  SHADOW TOLLS AS AN ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF FINANCING
The principal of the shadow toll is familiar in the transport context, but until
now it has only been used in two specific areas.
The first is tolled infrastructures, such as motorways, bridges or tunnels. In
order to achieve financial equilibrium and cover high investment costs, the
private sector operator needs to calculate the level of toll that is required to
recover the initial outlay, repay loans and provide a return on invested capital.
An excessively high toll will lead to a commensurate reduction in traffic as
there are limits to users’ willingness to pay. The consequence of this is lower
benefit in the socioeconomic evaluation of the infrastructure. In this case, one
option that is available to the public authority is to try to find the optimum price
which maximizes the benefit for society and to pay the private operator the
difference between the equilibrium toll and the optimum toll. A shadow toll
which is calculated in this way therefore becomes an annual expenditure
which changes according to the traffic on the infrastructure. This solution has
the disadvantage of generating recurring expenditure, unless an adjustment
mechanism is included that allows the total amount of the shadow toll to be
reduced to a point where it becomes non-existent when there is enough traffic
to achieve financial equilibrium.
The second area is in the framework of a Public-Private partnership. This is a
device aimed at limiting the risks associated with uncertainty as regards
changes in traffic. The profitability of a piece of infrastructure is still considered
in the long term (in excess of 20 years), because of the high investment cost.
Industrial risks aside, (cost of works, operating costs), the operator is faced
with a large number of uncontrollable events: political instability in some
countries, an uncertain economic climate (which can reduce transport
demand), a change in transport policy (which can lead to the construction of
competing projects), etc (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002). Another major risk is a
consequence the shortcomings of demand forecasting models, which are
unable to take account of long term changes in user behaviour. To deal with
this risk, concessions include a number of features, such as partial
guarantees of revenue if the real traffic differs excessively from the forecasts.
One mechanism that protects the private operator this lays down rules for
sharing the risk with regard to traffic, according to a four band system (Fisher
& Babbar, 1996): if traffic falls below a specified level, the public authorities
contract to top up revenue by means of a shadow toll in order to guarantee4/17
the financial viability of the private operator: in the same way, if traffic exceeds
the forecasts, the additional profits can be shared between the operator and
the public authorities. This is therefore a conditional mechanism, but one
which may, in the long term, result in rising costs for the community, if traffic
changes out of line with forecasts.
These two examples demonstrate that the shadow toll is in this case a
discontinuous corrective mechanism rather than a genuine tool for financing
new infrastructure construction. However; in recent years a different use of the
shadow toll has appeared. As a consequence of the ageing of infrastructures
and the need to undertake costly road renovation/reconstruction programmes,
some countries have introduced shadow tolls of a specific type. Whether the
project involved is to maintain untolled roads or to increase their capacity
(building an extra lane), private road operators are used in a partnership
arrangement: the public authority therefore pays a shadow toll that varies
according to the traffic in order to provide the resources required to pay for
works (Spackman, 2002). In the framework of concessions, private firms are
therefore given the responsibility of maintaining the infrastructure asset. 
A system of this type opens the way for wider use of shadow tolls to finance
the creation of new infrastructure. However, it is necessary to identify the
conditions under which this system can be of greater benefit to the public
authorities than the conventional investment grant mechanism. The aim of this
paper is to investigate, using theoretical simulations, the areas in which this
alternative could be appropriate.
4.  A MODEL FOR COMPARING DIFFERENT FUNDING MODES
Our comparison between the two modes of funding (grants versus shadow
tolls) will, in principle, involve tolled infrastructure projects whose profitability is
not certain, that is to say for which the forecast cash flows over the duration of
the concession do not allow a private operator to be sure of meeting the costs
associated with operation, servicing debts and providing a return on invested
private capital. In order to analyze the various possible situations the
simulation model incorporates a number of simplifications, based on the work
of (Bonnafous, 2002). The main hypotheses are as follows (see Table 1):
•  The total investment cost (denoted by INV) is spread out equally over the
entire concession duration (DT);
•  Financing is limited to three sources: 
-  private capital (FP) which includes any “quasi” private capital  or
capital linked to the subordinated debt; the amount of private capital
depends on the concession duration (DC), the required financial
internal rate of return (TO) and, of course, the cash flows for the
project;
-  total loans (EM) which, correspond to the principal debt; to simplify,
the amount involved depends on average values: the interest rate
(XI), the duration of loans (DE) and the cash flows; these loans5/17
generate repayment annuities (AN) which are constant throughout
the loan period;
-  in some cases an investment grant (SUB) whose purpose is to
ensure the private operator remains in profit. This corresponds to
the total investment cost minus private capital and loans;
•  the expected raw surplus corresponds, in this case, to the difference
between the toll revenue and the total operating costs; this will be used to
meet the repayment annuities (AN) and provide a return on the private
capital (FP) at the required rate TO;
•  to have simple functions to work with, it is considered that the cash flow
will increase linearly in accordance with the equation: 
CF(n) = EB*(1+XB*n), 
where EB is the raw surplus at opening, XB is the annual rate of growth of
EB and n the year in question. According to (Bonnafous, 2002) this is an
acceptable simplification for long durations. In the case of shadow toll
funding, the cash flow becomes: 
CFS(n) = EBX*(1+XBX*n) = (EB+ST)*(1+(XB+XST)*n)
•  the raw surplus on opening is distributed between servicing the debt and
providing a return on private capital on the basis of a distribution ratio
(RR). If RR = 100%, all the raw surplus at opening is allocated to
repayment of the principal debt. 
Figure 1 shows the two structures of financing. It should be noted that the
shadow toll increases the available cash flows and therefore provides a
means of either increasing the annuities (if the distribution ratio RR is
identical) , or increasing the return on or the amount of private capital.
4.1 Calculating the grant and the shadow toll
Risk is not considered explicitly in the analysis we are conducting here. It is
assumed that it is either taken into account within the investment cost or bank
interest rates. The risk as far as cash flows are concerned can easily be
simulated by modifying the values of the variables EB and XB.
•  Determining the grant involves several stages. The first consists of
estimating the total loans (EM) which is a direct consequence of the
duration of loans (DE), the interest rate (XI) and the sum of the annuities
(AN = RR*EB). For the purposes of simplification, it is assumed that a
single loan was taken out the year before the infrastructure was opened.
The total loan is in this case equal to the sum of discounted annuities at
the interest rate XI, i.e.:
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Where:
The amount of private capital (FP) is calculated as follows: the sum of the
cash flows (minus the annuities), discounted by the financial internal rate of
return (TO), must be equal to the discounted value of private capital, equally
distributed over the duration of works.
•  The grant is then calculated thus:
SUB = INV – FP – EM 
In the case of shadow toll funding, the variables ST and XST are determined
such that the investment grant (SUB) is equal to zero, i.e.: FPX + EMX = INV,
and it is assumed that the other conditions remain the same (interest rate,
duration, etc.).
Introducing this constraint is not enough to allow us to solve the equation, it
merely links the variables ST and XST. The public authority’s objective of cost
minimization therefore leads to the calculation of the sum of discounted
shadow tolls (VAST), which will be compared with the sum of discounted
investment grants (VASUB).
•  The loans are calculated (in the case of shadow toll finance) in an identical
manner using the formula:
•  Likewise, the value of private capital (in the case of shadow toll finance)
becomes:
4.2 Use of continuous functions
To simplify calculation of the discounted sums, they can be transformed into
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The values of the parameters K1 and K2 are linked and shown in Figure 2 for
different values of n and x. It is clearly apparent that the variable x is dominant
with regard to the variable n, except when x takes on a low value; in this
context x can be the bank interest rate (for loans), the reference rate (for
discounting public funds) or the required financial internal rate of return for
private capital.
With these functions, we express the sum of the discounted investment grant
as follows:
Similarly, the sum of the discounted shadow tolls is expressed by
As a result of the fact that with the shadow toll the grant must be nil, it is
necessary that FPX+EMX=INV, which leads to a fairly complex expression of
the following form that links ST and XST:
This allows us to express VAST as a function of ST. However, this is a
decreasing function for ST > 0, which means that we cannot calculate a
minimum value for VAST in a straightforward manner. An additional condition
must be introduced. We decided to impose the condition ST(DC)=0 in order to
adjust the amount of the shadow toll to the duration of the concession. This
implies that:
Or:
Table 2 shows an example of a simulation for a project whose economic
internal rate of return is close to the reference rate of 8% that applies in
France. Classical financing by means of grants requires the public purse to
contribute more than one third of the total investment cost in order to
guarantee the financial feasibility on the basis of the bank interest rate and the
required return on private capital. Financing by means of a fairly moderate
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shadow toll gives an interesting result in this case, as its discounted cost is
only very slightly higher than the discounted cost of the envisaged grant. This
solution seems acceptable when the public authority is subjected to severe
budget constraints.
5.  UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS IS A SHADOW TOLL AN APPROPRIATE
ALTERNATIVE?
A number of simulations have been performed in order to establish the
conditions under which the use of shadow tolls can provide an acceptable, or
even a less costly, alternative to investment grants. Many factors affect the
values of the shadow toll and these are displayed in Table 3.
Firstly, we must stress that the value of the raw surplus on opening (EB) and
its annual rate of growth have an impact on the amount of private capital (FP
and FPX), and the size of loans (EM and EMX), the grant (SUB) and the
shadow toll (ST and XST), but as these effects are proportional, they have no
impact on the VAST  /  VASUB ratio. In other terms, the outcome of a
comparison between financing by means of a grant and by means of a
shadow toll is not affected by the values selected for EB and XB. 
Applying the scenario described in Table 2, Table 3 sets out the values for the
various parameters which provide a VAST  /  VASUB ratio of unity, which
means the cost for the two modes of finance are the same. From this table we
can see that the following are required in order to reduce the VAST / VASUB
ratio:
-  An increase in the duration of works (DT) 
-  An increase in the reference rate (TR)
-  A reduction in the concession duration (DC) 
-  An increase in the distribution ratio (RR)
-  An increase in the duration of loans (DE) 
-  A reduction in the interest rates on loans (XI)
-  A reduction in the required financial internal rate of return (TO) 
However, the first three variables change the general economics of the
project, and increase the discounted value of the grant. In particular, reducing
the duration of the concession does not appear to be an appropriate means of
improving financing.
The last three variables are of more interest, insofar as they will tend to
reduce both the value of the grant (SUB) and the shadow toll on opening (ST).
•  The distribution ratio (RR) is a strong hypothesis in the model, as it
indicates the proportion of the raw surplus that is allocated to servicing the
debt. It is therefore the result of a trade-off between the repayment of
loans and the return on private capital. In view of the demands made by
banks and the need to cover the risks associated with traffic levels, it is
reasonable to expect high values of RR (of the order of 90%). This means9/17
that in the structure of financing, the amount of loans is significantly
greater than the amount of private capital. The decision to implement such
a strategy depends entirely on the private consortium that has been
granted the concession, and the public authority cannot directly influence
this choice. However, we can suggest that shadow toll financing is a form
of guarantee against risks which can encourage high RR values.
•  The duration of loans (DE) can probably be increased for the same
reasons as in the previous case, as the shadow toll is an annual flow that
is guaranteed by the public authority. 
•  The interest rate on loans (XI) is a variable that depends on the state of
the financial markets. Without going into further detail here, we can simply
state that the lower this is, the more possible it becomes to use shadow
tolls.
•  Finally, it would seem possible to negotiate a reduction in the required
financial internal rate of return (TO) as long as the shadow toll provides a
guarantee with regard to future revenue.
The VAST / VASUB ratio can thus be adjusted on the basis of the interest rate
on loans (XI) and the percentage of the raw surplus that is allocated to the
payment of annuities (RR). Figure 3 shows how this ratio changes for XI
values of between 1% and 10% and RR values of between 50 % and 100 %.
These charts show that, for the basic scenario we have considered, use of the
shadow toll is always more costly when the RR is below 55%. However, when
RR is higher, use of a shadow toll can be advantageous, even when interest
rates are high.
Likewise, the influence of the interest rate XI must be analyzed as a function
of the financial internal rate of return (TO). Figure 4 shows how the
VAST / VASUB ratio changes for various values of these rates in the case
where RR = 80 %. It can be seen that XI has a greater influence than TO.
6.  CONCLUSION
These first simulations demonstrate that under certain conditions it would
seem to be possible to use a shadow toll as an alternative to an investment
grant. The analysis we have conducted here essentially involves a
comparison between the discounted costs of the two modes of finance, but
the scale of these costs in absolute terms must, of course, be borne in mind. 
Also, when we compare the discounted values of the grant and the shadow
toll, it is assumed that public money is available, but in view of the constraints
on public budgets a loan is likely to be needed, under financial terms that may
be different. It would therefore be necessary to take account of the financial
costs for the public authority generated by each alternative.10/17
Likewise, the choice of a cost equivalence for the two modes of funding does
not take account of the real difficulties involved in mobilizing public funds. For
example, if shadow toll finance is chosen when the project’s VAST / VASUB
ratio is 1.3, this will reveal that the local authority has strong preference for
this infrastructure project, compared to other possible investments in its area
of competence (education, health, or alternative transport projects).
The theoretical model we have proposed should therefore be further refined
with reference to more complex structures of finance, for example different
durations of loans or concession for the two modes of finance. In the same
way, a more realistic separation between the different sources of funding is
necessary, and risk as regards future revenue should be taken into account in
an explicit manner. Nevertheless, this analysis shows clearly that while Public-
Private Partnerships are frequently considered as being a more costly solution
than direct investment by the public authority, different forms of finance can
significantly reduce the anticipated additional costs and provide a means of
avoiding the budgetary constraints that are tending to delay infrastructure
construction.
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Figure 2: Change in factors K1 and K2 as a function of the duration n
and the rate x 
Figure 3: Influence of the parameters RR and XI on the VAST / VASUB
ratio
XI = 1%
RR = 50 %
XI = 1%
RR = 100 %
XI = 10%
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XI = 10%
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Figure 4: Influence of the variables TO and XI on the VAST / VASUB ratio
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Table 1: Variables that influence the structure of financing
Variable Comments
Characteristics of project
INV Investment cost Set at 100 by convention
DT Duration of works Variable between 1 and 10 years
EB Expected raw surplus at opening
XB Linear rate of growth of EB over the
duration of the concession
EB(t) Raw surplus in year t EB(t) = EB*(1+XB*t)
VANe Economic Net Present Value Discounted with the rate TR
TRIe Economic Internal Rate of Return Economic IRR of project
FINANCING BY GRANT
Community
TR Reference rate Official value in France: 8 %
SUB Investment grant Calculated by the model – equally
divided over the duration of works
Loan
XI Average interest rate for loans 
DE Duration of the loan
RR Distribution ratio of raw surplus for
servicing of debt
EM Amount of loans Calculated by the model
Private capital
TO Required Financial IRR 
DC Duration of the concession More than 20 years
FP Amount of private capital Calculated by the model
FINANCING BY SHADOW TOLL
ST Shadow toll on opening Calculated by the model
XST Rate of growth of ST Calculated by the model
ST(t) Shadow toll in year n =(EB+ST)*(1+(XB+XST)*t) – EB(t)
EBX Raw surplus on opening
XBX Linear rate of growth of EBX over
the duration of the concession with
shadow toll
Calculated by the model such that
SUB = 0 and STX(DC) = 0
EBX = EB + ST
XBX = XB + XST
FPX Amount of private capital Calculated by the model
EMX Amount of loans Calculated by the model
ANX Amount of annuities ANX = RR*(EB+ST)
COMPARISON INDICATORS
VASUB Sum of discounted investment
grants
Discounted with the reference rate TR 
VAST Sum of discounted shadow tolls
shadow toll
Discounted with the reference rate TR
VAST / VASUB ratio A ratio of less than unity shows that
financing by shadow toll is less costly
for the community16/17
Tableau 2: Example of simulation
Hypotheses
(Characteristics of project)
Investment cost INV 100
Duration of works DT 4 years
Raw surplus EB 7.0
Rate of increase in EB XB 3.0 %
Reference rate TR 8.0 %
Rate of interest XI 2.0 %
Duration of loans DE 10 years
Distribution ratio RR 50.0 %
Required Financial IRR TO 15.0 %
Concession duration DC 30 years
Net Present Economic Value VANe -1.1






EM 31.7 Loans EMX 57.2
FP 30.7 Private capital FPX 42.8
SUB 37.6 Grant
Shadow Toll ST 5.6
Rate of growth of
Shadow Toll XST -2.9 %
VASUB 41.3 Discounted values VAST 43.5
VAST / VASUB Ratio
1.05






















Table 3: Impact of the hypotheses as regards the discounted value of the shadow toll for VAST/VASUB ratio = 1
Simulation
Base DT TR DC RR DE XIT O
INV Investment cost 100,0 
DT Duration of works 4 years 7 years 4 years 4 years 4 years 4 years 4 years 4 years
TR Reference rate 8,0% 8,0% 8,7% 8,0% 8,0% 8,0% 8,0% 8,0%
DC Duraion of concession 30 years 30 years 30 years 25 years 30 years 30 years 30 years 30 years
EB Raw surplus in year 1 7,0  7,0 7,0 7,0  7,0 7,0 7,0 7,0 
XB Rate of growth of EB 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0%
RR Distribution ratio (debt) 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0% 57,6% 50,0% 50,0% 50,0%
DE Duration of loan 10 years 10 years 10 years 10 years 10 years 11 years 10 years 10 years
XI Loan interest rate 2,0% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0% 0,4% 2,0%
TO Required IRR for private capital 15,0% 15,0% 15,0% 15,0% 15,0% 15,0% 15,0% 12,9%
Project profitability indicators
VANe Economic Net Present Value of project -1,1  -16,2  -10,1  -4,4  -1,1  -1,1  -1,1  -1,1 
TRIe Economic IRR of project 7,9% 7,1% 7,9% 7,7% 7,9% 7,9% 7,9% 7,9%
Financing by grant
SUB Grant 37,6 44,5 37,6 38,5  35,1 35,1 35,1 30,0 
EMC Loan  (1) 31,7 31,7 31,7 31,7  36,5 34,9 34,3 31,7 
FP Private  capital  (1) 30,7 23,7 30,7 29,7  28,4 30,0 30,7 38,2 
VASUB Discounted  value  of  grant 41,3 55,6 41,6 42,3  38,5 38,5 38,5 33,0 
Financing by shadow toll
ST Shaow  toll  at  year  1 5,6 7,2 5,6 6,0  5,0 5,0 5,0 4,3 
XST Rate of growth of ST -2,9% -3,3% -2,9% -3,3% -2,7% -2,7% -2,7% -2,4%
EMX Loan  (2) 57,2 64,3 57,2 58,8  62,5 59,8 58,6 51,0 
FPX Private  capital  (2) 42,8 35,7 42,8 41,2  37,5 40,2 41,4 49,0 
VAST Sum  of  discounted  shadow  tolls 43,5 55,6 41,6 42,3  38,6 38,5 38,5 32,9 
Comparison
VAST/VASUB ratio 1,05 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00